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Abstract 
Certificate-based cryptosystem combines the advantage of both traditional public key cryptosystem and identity based 
cryptosystem as it avoids the usage of certificates and resolves the key escrow problem. Recently, Liu et al. proposed 
a short and efficient certificate-based signature scheme and showed that the scheme was secure in the random oracles. 
In this paper, we show that Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme is universally forgeable by a Type I 
adversary who models an uncertified entity and can replace the public keys of entities at will, but is not allowed to 
obtain the target user’s certificate. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
In a traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC), when Alice wishes to send a message to Bob, Alice 
signs a message using her private key, verifier Bob verifies the signature using Alice’s public key. 
However, Alice’s public key is just merely a random string and it needs a certificate issued by a trusted 
party called the Certificate Authority (CA) to guarantee the authenticity of her public key. It is generally 
considered that the certificates in traditional PKC are costly to use and manage. Identity-based 
cryptosystem (IBC) solves the aforementioned problem by using Alice’s identity (or email address) as her 
public key while the corresponding private key is generated by a trusted third party called the private key 
generator (PKG). However, there exists an inherent drawback called private key escrow problem in an ID-
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based public key cryptography. That is, the PKG knows the private key of every user and can decrypt any 
ciphertext or forge the user’s signature on any message. Certificate-based cryptosystem combines the 
advantage of both traditional public key cryptosystem and identity based cryptosystem. In 2004, Kang et 
al.[1] firstly proposed the notion of certificate-based signature. In a certificate-based signature scheme, 
each user generates his/her own private and public keys and requests a certificate from the Certificate 
Authority (CA) while the CA generates the certificate from the user’s identity and his/her public key. To 
sign for a message, the signer must have the knowledge of both certificate and private key. Knowing only 
one of them should not be able to generate a valid signature. Li et al. [2] showed that Kang et al.’s 
certificate-based signature [1] was insecure against key replacement attacks, and refined their security 
model for certificate-based signature. As introduced in [2], adversaries in certificate-based signature can 
be roughly divided into two types. The Type I attacker simulates the scenario where the adversary 
(anyone except the CA) can replace the public keys of entities at will, but is not allowed to obtain the 
target user’s certificate, while the Type II attacker simulates a malicious CA who can produce certificates 
but cannot replace the target user’s public key. More elaborated security models of certificate-based 
signature are given in [3, 4], where the Type I/II adversary for certificate-based signatures are classified
into three kinds, namely, normal adversary, strong adversary and super adversary(ordered by their attack 
power). Recently, using the enhanced security model given in [2], Liu et al. [5] proposed a short and 
efficient certificate-based signature scheme, which is provably secure in the random oracle model and just 
requires one scalar elliptic curve multiplication for the signing stage and contains one element for both the 
public key and signature size. It is shorter than the previous certificate-based signature schemes [1, 2, 6, 7, 
8, 9] which require at least two elements for the signature size. In this paper, we show that Liu et al.’s 
certificate-based signature scheme [5] is insecure against the Type I adversaries. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Liu et al.’s certificate-based
signature scheme. In Section 3, we show that Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme is not secure 
against the Type I adversaries. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4. 
2. Review of Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme 
Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme [5] involves three entities, i.e. CA, signer and verifier, 
and consists of the following five algorithms: 
Setup. The CA firstly selects a pairing : Te G G G× → where the order of G  is p , a generator g  of 
G , two collision resistant cryptographic hash functions: { }1 : 0,1H G∗ → , { }2 : 0,1 pH Z∗ → , then 
randomly selects pZα ∈ and computes                                                                             
1g g
α=                                                                                                                                  (1) 
The public parameters params are ( )1, , , , ,Te G G p g g and the master secret key msk is α .
UserKeyGen. User selects a secret value px Z∈ as his secret key usk , and computes his public key  
PK as                                  
            xY g=                                                                                                                                    (2) 
Certify. Given public parameters params , the master secret key msk , public key PK of the user ID ,
the CA computes certificate
           ( )1 ,C H ID PK α=                                                                                                               (3) 
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Sign. To sign a message  { }0,1m ∗∈ , the signer computes 
            2
1
( , , )x H m ID PKCδ += (4) 
δ is the resultant signature on the message m .
Verify. On receiving a signature on a message m , the verifier checks whether
            ( )( ) ( )( )2 , , 1 1, , ,H m ID PKe Y g e H ID PK gδ ⋅ =                                                                  (5) 
3. Cryptanalysis of Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme 
 The security models of certificate-based signatures are defined by two different games. In Game I, the 
type I adversary models an uncertified entity, while in Game II, the type II adversary models the 
malicious CA in possession of the master key msk attacking a fixed entity’s public key. In this section, 
we firstly describe game I specified in [2, 5], which is used to show a certificate-based signature scheme 
to be existential unforgeable against the Type I adversaries. Then we show that Liu et al.’s certificate-
based signature scheme is insecure, even is universally forgeable by a Type I adversary. That is, there 
exists a Type I adversary who can always win the Game I and forge a signature on any message. 
3.1. Secure against a Type I adversary 
Game 1. The challenger runs Setup to generate public parameters params  and the master secret key 
msk , and gives params to the adversary IA  and keeps msk  to itself. The adversary IA  adaptively 
performs a polynomially bounded number of oracle queries as below: 
User-Key-Gen Query ( )ID . On receiving this request, if ID  has been already created, nothing is to be 
carried out. Otherwise, the challenger runs the algorithm UserKeyGen to obtain a secret/public key pair ( ),usk PK . Then it adds the triple ( ), ,ID usk PK  to the list L. In this case, ID is said to be created. 
In both cases, PK is returned. 
Corruption Query ( )ID . On receiving this request, the challenger checks the list L. If ID  is there, it 
returns the corresponding secret key usk . Otherwise nothing is returned.  
Certification Query ( )ID . On receiving this request, the challenger runs Certify and returns certificate
C .
Key-Replace Query ( ), ,ID PK usk . On receiving this request, the challenger checks if PK is the 
public key corresponding to the secret key usk . If yes, it updates the secret/public key pair to the list L. 
Otherwise it outputs ⊥ meaning invalid operation. 
Signing Query ( , , )ID PK m . On receiving this request, the challenger generates δ by using algorithm 
Sign.
Eventually, IA outputs ( , , )ID m δ∗ ∗ ∗ , where ID∗ is the identity of a target user, m∗ is a message, and δ ∗ is a signature for m∗ . IA wins the game if   
(1) δ ∗ is a valid signature on the message m∗ under the public key PK ∗ with user information ID∗ ,
where PK ∗ is either the one returned from User-Key-Gen Query or a valid input to the Key-Replace 
Query.
(2) ID∗has never been submitted to the Certification Query.
(3) ( , , )ID PK m∗ ∗ ∗ has never been submitted to the Signing Query.
IA ’s advantage in this game is defined as 
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              Adv(A ) = Pr[A wins] I I                                                                                                 (6) 
3.2. Attacks on Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme 
Recently, using the enhanced security model given in [2], Liu et al. [5] proposed a short and efficient 
certificate-based signature scheme, and claimed that their scheme [5] was proved to be secure against the 
type I/II adversaries. In this section, we will show that Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme is 
not secure against the Type I adversaries. That is, a Type I adversary A I can obtain the partial private 
key of a target user (with identity ID∗ ).
The challenger runs Setup to generate public parameters 1( , , , , , )Tparams e G G p g g= and the 
master secret key msk , then gives params  to the adversary A I and keeps msk to itself. Recall the 
restrictions in game I, it is legal for A I  to carry out the following query. 
1. A I makes user-key-gen query ( )ID
∗ to obtain user’s public key PK ∗ .
2. A I  issues corruption query ( )ID
∗ to obtain user’s secret key x .
3.  A I makes signing query ( , , )ID PK m
∗ ∗ to obtain signature δ ∗ .
4.  A I obtains the hash value 2 ( , , )H m ID PK
∗ ∗ by making hash query. 
According to Sign algorithm, A I can compute the user’s certificate C as follows:  
          
( ) 2 ( , , )x H m ID PKC δ ∗ ∗+∗=
                                                                                                          (7) 
As a result, the adversary 
A I can forge a signature on any message and win the Game I. Therefore, Liu 
et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme [5] is insecure, even is universally forgeable by the Type I 
adversary.  
The weakness of Liu et al.’s certificate-based signature scheme against the type I adversary is due to 
the fact that their signature scheme is deterministic. In fact, as in [8, 9], using random value in the Sign 
algorithm can resolve the problem, but it will be at cost of the signature length. So, the feasibility of a 
short certificate-based signature scheme provably fitting the enhanced security model of [2] still remains a 
challenging open problem. 
4. Conclusion 
Short signatures are important in low-bandwidth communication, low-storage and low-computation 
environments, such as printing a signature on a postage stamp, a commerce invoice or a bank bill. 
Recently, Liu et al. proposed a short and efficient certificate-based signature scheme [5] and showed that 
the scheme was secure in the random oracles. In this paper, we have showed that Liu et al.’s certificate-
based signature scheme [5] is universally forgeable by a Type I adversary who models an uncertified
entity and can replace the public keys of entities at will, but is not allowed to obtain the target user’s 
certificate. The feasibility of a short certificate-based signature scheme provably fitting the enhanced 
security model of [2] still remains a challenging open problem. 
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